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Abstract
Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982), we analyze an inﬁnite horizon entry model where
an incumbent may use its current price to signal its strength, in order to deter entry. In contrast
with conventional limit pricing, we show that due to the importance of entrantsʼ types on the
post-entry duopoly/oligopoly proﬁts, the incumbent may want to signal its weakness to invite
the entry of weaker ﬁrms. We also provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for this
phenomenon to arise in equilibrium, in the benchmark cases that no second entry is proﬁtable.
Keywords: Dynamic signaling, limit pricing, entry deterrence
JEL Classiﬁcation: D42, D43, D82, L11
I. Introduction
Since the seminal work of Spence (1973) the motive of informational signaling has been
applied fruitfully to explain economic behavior in various contexts such as education,
advertising, entry deterrence, corporate ﬁnance, etc.
1 The core argument of these explanations
is that an agent with more favorable information would incur a cost to signal the information, if
the marketʼs inference on the favorable information were to lead to an outcome that would
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1 A survey paper by Riley (2001) has an excellent discussion on this literature.compensate for the signaling cost. In many situations each signaling need and its eﬀect appear
to be self-contained and hence may be analyzed in one-shot settings, as has been done in most
signaling studies hitherto. In certain circumstances, however, signaling needs are recurrent and
can evolve over time.
In a limit pricing context, in particular, an incumbent may face entry threats recurrently
rather than once, and its response to new threats would change as the industry landscape
evolves owing to entry. In such cases, signaling may have a long-lasting eﬀect and hence needs
to be evaluated from a more dynamic perspective. In this paper we conduct such an analysis
and discover a new insight: By signaling its own weakness/ineﬃciency, an incumbent may
want to invite more entry than there would have been otherwise. The basiclogicbehind this is
that allowing such entries (which are relatively weak contenders) beneﬁts the incumbent in the
long-run by discouraging future entry by stronger contenders. We refer to this phenomenon as
anti-limit pricing due to its contrast with conventional limit pricing in its motive (to promote,
rather than deter, entry), and consequently, in the direction of the distortion of the signaling act.
A brief review of the limit pricing literature may be useful. Bain (1949) introduced the
notion of limit price as the highest price that incumbents can charge without inducing entry,
and establishes that “it is... consistent with such proﬁt maximization by the established seller(s)
that price will be held at the limit level continually through time” (p.455, emphasis added). His
discussion remains informal, however, as to why entry decisions are inﬂuenced by pre-entry
prices, and consequently, also on the determination of the limit price.
Several authors formalized this link, thereby rationalizing limit pricing. Milgrom and
Roberts (1982) show that the incumbent may price below the myopic optimal level in order to
signal its low cost and deter entry. Matthews and Mirman (1983) and Bagwell and Ramey
(1990) illustrate similar pricing behavior to deter entry by signaling unfavorable market
demand. Harrington (1986) shows that an incumbent may distort its monopoly pricing upwards
to deter entry if the potential entrant does not know its own cost but knows that it is strongly
correlated with the incumbentʼsco s t .
2 Extending the analysis to allow for multiple incumbents,
Harrington (1987) ﬁnds uncoordinated entry deterrence possible when the entrant observes only
the market price, while Bagwell and Ramey (1991) ﬁnd that no distortion is the only robust
outcome if the entrant is able to observe the individual choices of the incumbents. In a quality-
signaling model of experience goods, Overgaard (1994) shows that potential entry exacerbates
the upward price distortion which had been known to prevail in such markets even in the
absence of potential entry by, among others, Bagwell and Riordan (1991).
In all these papers incumbents distort price to deter potential entry, by way of signaling
adverse market conditions for the entrant. Note that the price distortion from this motive can be
upward, rather than downward, depending on the speciﬁcenvironments c onsidered, i.e., in
Harrington (1986) and Overgaard (1994).
3 The anti-limit pricing also exhibits an upward price
distortion, however, we stress that it results from a fundamentally diﬀerent motive, namely, to
induce/promote entry of a weak entrant who would not enter otherwise, by way of signaling
accommodating market conditions for the entrant.
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2 If the correlation is weak, the standard limit pricing obtains.
3 Bagwell and Ramey (1990) also considers a special case in which the incumbent may distort price upward when
the ﬁrms engage in Bertrand competition after entry, but this happens essentially to “trick” the entrant into pricing high,
rather than to inﬂuence the entry decision.This contrast in the underlying motives is attributable, at least partly, to the fact that in all
previous studies mentioned above the analysis was conducted in a two-period context
4:I fi ti s
successful in deterring entry in the ﬁrst period, the incumbent enjoys monopoly proﬁti nt h e
second period without any further entry threat. Two-period models illustrate the main eﬀects of
signaling very clearly. However, they do not capture a more dynamic eﬀect of limit pricing,
which arises because the price needs to be held at the limit level continually as Bain observed
in the quote above. This constitutes the main force behind the anti-limit pricing as explained
below.
With recurring entry threats, the incumbent cannot initiate the monopoly price even after it
has succeeded in deterring entry, because it needs to deal with the new threat. However, this
does not mean that limit pricing cannot be compensated because the compensation comes not
from the incumbentʼs proﬁt being equal to the monopoly proﬁt after deterring entry, but from it
being higher than what it would have been if there had been an entry. Hence, a limit price can
play dual roles, namely, that of signaling strength, and that of compensating for the signaling
loss by delaying a lower, post-entry proﬁt. A potential downside of this which is absent in two-
period models is that entry, when it happens, brings in a tougher competitor due to the
signalled strength of the incumbent, which reduces the incumbentʼs post-entry proﬁt s .I ft h i s
eﬀect is large, an incumbent may want to signal weakness rather than strength.
In our model, a new potential entrant arrives in each period with a private type. As in
Milgrom and Roberts (1982), a weak ﬁrm would enter only if it infers the incumbent to be
weak, hence can be deterred by proper signaling, but a strong ﬁrm would enter regardless of
the incumbentʼs type. Continued limit pricing therefore delays entry but eventually results in a
strong entry after which the incumbent will be left with but a small duopoly proﬁt due to
tougher competition. Alternatively, if the incumbent appears to be weak by pricing high, even a
weak entrant would enter, after which the incumbentʼs duopoly proﬁt would be larger than that
after a strong entry. In eﬀect, this alternative behavior replaces the anticipated entry with an
earlier yet weaker one on average.
5 If i) an arrived entrant is neither too likely to be strong nor
too likely to be weak so that this replacement eﬀect is signiﬁcant, and ii) the incumbent is
patient enough that the post-entry proﬁt is important, then it pays oﬀ for the incumbent to
signal weakness by pricing high, and thereby invite weak entrants in, for the sake of enhancing
post-entry proﬁts, which results in anti-limit pricing. On the other hand, conventional limit
pricing tends to arise when the incumbent is less patient and the entrant is not too likely to be
strong.
Note that both the direction of distortion and the impact of signaling are reversed between
anti-limit pricing and conventional limit pricing. This means that the incumbents may take
fundamentally diﬀerent deterrence decisions when faced with recurrent entry threats rather than
a single threat, potentially leading to vastly diﬀerent policy implications. This is a caution also
emphasized by Bernheim (1984), although informational issues make the nature of our analysis
quite diﬀerent from his.
6
ANTI-LIMIT PRICING 2010] 59
4 The only exception we know (in limit pricing literature) is Harrington (1984) who provide an inﬁnite-horizon
extension of the result reported in Harrington (1986).
5 Hence, the decision whether to signal strength or weakness becomes a choice between a tough competitor later and
a weak competitor now. In this sense anti-limit pricing can be regarded as a selection towards a weak type and early
entry, as suggested by the referee.
6 Speciﬁcally, he shows that policies making deterrence activity more costly, may have a perverse eﬀect ofThe observation that an incumbent might want to induce entry by a weak ﬁrm to preempt
that by a strong ﬁrm has been documented: Rockett (1990) reports that Du Pont licensed its
polyester, cellophane and nylon patents selectively to weaker potential competitors shortly
before the patents expired, and Comanor (1964) cites similar motives among pharmaceutical
ﬁrms. It has also been theoretically shown that in certain environments an incumbent, in the
face of potential threat of a strong entrant, would ﬁnd it optimal to induce a weak entrant that
would have been deterred otherwise. Speciﬁcally, in complete information models in which a
weak ﬁrm and a strong ﬁrm make entry decisions in a predetermined order, Rockett (1990)
characterizes when it is optimal to license only to a weak ﬁrm to deter entry of a strong ﬁrm
when the patent expires, and Ashiya (2000) characterizes when it is optimal for an incumbent
to position itself in a diﬀerentiated market to allow entry of a weak ﬁrm, in order to deter a
strong entrant that arrives later by overcrowding the market. In these studies, an incumbent can
induce a weak entry by committing to an action that changes the continuation game to one that
is accommodating for a weak ﬁrm. Thus, their arguments do not apply to environments in
which such commitments are not available, which is the case in settings of repeated games with
possibility of entry as in our model. In particular, in such settings it may not be possible for an
incumbent to inﬂuence the entry decision of a weak ﬁrm as long as the information is
complete. Under incomplete information, on the other hand, we show that an incumbent can
induce entry by inﬂuencing the entrantʼs “perception” of the continuation game towards one that
is more accommodating for a weak entrant, i.e., weak entry may be enticed via signaling.
A handful of papers exist on dynamicsignaling. Noldeke and Van Damme (1990),
Swinkels (1999) and Kremer and Skrzypacz (2007) study informed sellers who, due to lack of
commitment ability, may incur costs for long enough to signal eﬀectively to uninformed agents,
who decide when as well as how to respond. Kaya (2009) examines the least costly way of
signaling over time in a repeated setting with publichistory. Our work di ﬀers from these
studies in that it emphasizes that the current signal inﬂuences not only the current response but
how the entire market evolves afterwards, and derives new insights on the signaling behavior
driven by the latter impact.
Section II presents an inﬁnite-horizon model and an equilibrium concept. Section III
focuses on environments where no more than one entry is viable and fully characterizes when
anti-limit pricing arises, and Section IV provides an illustrative example. Section V
demonstrates that anti-limit pricing is a phenomenon that arises in a wider class of
environments and in a variety of forms. Section VI contains some concluding remarks. Some
technical details are collected in Appendix.
II. Model
We use an inﬁnite horizon version of the two-type model of Milgrom and Roberts (1982).
A monopoly ﬁrm produces a product from period 0 onwards. At each future period t=1, 2, …,
one potential entrant arrives in the market with probability q (0, 1), in which case it observes
the market situation (to be detailed below), and decides whether to enter or not. If it does not
enter, it leaves the market for good. No potential entrant arrives with probability 1,q in each
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discouraging entry by lowering the value of entry due to more entries anticipated in the future.period t=1, 2, ….
Each ﬁrm i, either the incumbent or a potential entrant, has either an eﬃcient production
technology (a “strong” type, denoted by s)o ra ni n e ﬃcient one (a “weak” type, denoted by w).
A strong type is more eﬃcient in the sense that its marginal cost is no higher than that of a
weak type, i.e.,
c' w(q)Bc' s(q)B0, "qB0, (1)
where cz(·) is the cost function of type z {s, w}. We assume that there is no ﬁxed cost, i.e., cs
(0)=cw(0)=0, which is mainly for expositional ease as explained at the end of Section III. The
types are private and independent random variables that assume s and w with probabilities ms
and mw=1,ms, respectively, for each entrant arriving in each period, and with probabilities ms
and mw=1,ms, respectively, for the incumbent.
We assume that the market demand remains the same across periods: we denote the
inverse demand function by p(q) and assume that it is continuously diﬀerentiable and p'(q)?0
for all q>0. If entry occurs in any period, the entrant pays a ﬁxed entry/setup cost K>0 and,
to be consistent with existing papers on limit pricing, it is assumed that the types of the ﬁrms
in the market become commonly known between them (but not to future potential entrants) so
that they engage in Cournot competition under complete information in that period and
onwards, until another ﬁrm enters and joins Cournot competition in the same manner.
7 Each
ﬁrm is maximizing its expected d-discounted sum of proﬁt stream net of any entry cost, where
d (0, 1) is the common discount factor.
Depending on how much of the past history each arriving potential entrant observes, the
details of analysis change. To allow for any scope of signaling, we should assume that the
entrant arriving in each period observes the market price of the immediately preceding period
(as well as the number of existing ﬁrms). Alternatively, we may assume either that the entrant
observes the number of periods that have passed, in addition to the price level of the last
period; or that it observes the full history of price levels. Since observing the price level is
equivalent to observing the (total) output level, we use the latter expression which proves
useful.
For expositional clarity, we present the main analysis assuming that each potential entrant,
upon arrival, only observes the last periodʼs output level. In this case, since the continuation
game from each period is undistinguished so long as what happened in the last period is the
same, the equilibrium has the Markov property. In the alternative cases mentioned above, the
equilibrium is more complex because the entrant updates its belief on the incumbentʼs type
based on the observable history. Nonetheless, the main results of the paper carry through in
these cases as explained in the latter part of Section III.
Since the arrived entrants are assumed to observe only the last periodʼs output level
without knowing how many periods have passed, they face the same game upon arrival
provided no entry has occurred by then: In particular, they possess the same belief on the
incumbentʼs types, placing probability ms for it being strong as of the beginning of the previous
period. In other words, each entrant perceives the game as described above with itself arriving
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7 We do not consider the possibility of collusion which, we think, is a separate issue that goes beyond the purpose of
this paper. Furthermore, the incentive to induce a weak entry appears robust to the collusion possibility because the
incumbentʼs bargaining share of the collusion outcome would be larger when the partner is weak than when strong.in period t=1. Conceptually, this model captures a market that has been a monopoly for an
unspeciﬁed length of time.
In this section we deﬁne equilibrium presuming that once the market reaches duopoly no
further entry is proﬁtable. This is the case when the entry cost K is not recouped by even the
best possible proﬁt stream for a potential third ﬁrm in the market. If we use the notation p
T
i(z1,
z2, z3) to denote the Cournot equilibrium proﬁto fﬁrm i when there are 3 ﬁrms in the market
and ﬁrm iʼs type is zi {s, w}, i=1, 2, 3, then this condition can be written as
p
T
3(w, w, s)?(1,d)K. (2)
Let pz(q):=p(q)q,cz(q) denote the monopoly proﬁt of an incumbent of type z {s, w}
when it produces output q. To avoid inessential complications and facilitate analysis, we make
the following standard assumptions.
1. The optimal (myopic) monopoly output levels, denoted by qs and qw for a strong and a
weak type, respectively, are unique and qs>qw>0.
2. The reaction curves are negatively sloped and the Cournot duopoly equilibrium is
unique for every possible type conﬁguration of a duopoly.
8
Whether an incumbent exercises (anti-)limit pricing or not can be ambiguous without the
ﬁrst assumption. The second assumption eliminates coordination problem between duopoly
ﬁrms, which is inessential for the purpose of this paper. These properties hold in familiar cases
such as the one with a linear demand and constant marginal costs. We may now let p
D
i (z1, z2)
denote the (one-period) Cournot equilibrium duopoly proﬁt of an incumbent (i=1) of type z1











In period t=0 the incumbent chooses an output level q and earns a monopoly proﬁt pz1(q).
If entry occurs in the next period, the two ﬁrms earn duopoly proﬁts p
D
1(z1, z2)a n dp
D
2(z1, z2)
from that period onwards; If entry does not occur the incumbent maintains its monopoly
position, and the continuation game is the same as the original game.
Since there will be no further entry once the market reaches duopoly due to (2), the
continuation value (i.e., the discounted sum of the expected proﬁts t r e a m )o faz1 -type





2 (z1, z2)$(1,d). Hence, according to (3), the entry decision of each entrant of
either type is trivial regardless of the incumbentʼs type if (1,d)K exceeds p
D
2 (w, s), is in
between p
D
2(s, s)a n dp
D
2(w, w), or falls short of p
D





2(w, s), on the other hand, only standard limit-pricing may arise






so that a weak entrant may or may not enter depending on the probability that the incumbent is
strong. This is the environment in which anti-limit pricing arises as will be elaborated in
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8 Suﬃcient conditions for this can be found in Vives (1996), pp.96-98, for example.Section III and illustrated in Section IV.
Recall that, once an entry occurs, the Cournot duopoly outcome prevails in all future
periods due to (2). By (3) and (4), therefore, a strong entrant always enters in equilibrium if
there was no previous entry, which we take for granted below. A strategy of a weak entrant is a
function t(·): R+→ [0, 1] where t(q) is the probability that this entrant enters upon observing
the monopoly output q in the previous period.
Given a weak entrantʼs strategy t (·), consider an optimal strategy of the incumbent,
denoted by q=(q0, q1, …), producing an output qt in period t=0, 1, …, provided that no entry
has occurred by then. Being an optimal strategy, q is no worse than qB1=(q1, q2, …), i.e.,
producing qt+1 in period t=0, 1, …, so long as no entry has occurred. In addition, since qB1 is
optimal once period 1 is reached with no entry, qB1 is no worse than q because q is also
feasible in the continuation game. Hence, q and qB1 are equivalent in period 1 if no entry has
occurred. Applying the same logic repeatedly, we deduce that it is also optimal to employ q in
each period until an entry occurs, i.e., always producing q0 while a monopolist. By the same
token, q is also equivalent to always producing qt for any ﬁxed t=1, 2, …, while a monopolist.
For our purpose of examining the incumbentʼs output levels while a monopolist, therefore, it
suﬃces to consider Markov production strategies that do not vary across periods as long as no
entry has occurred: A strategy of an incumbent of type z {s, w} is a probability distribution s
(·; z) over R+, where s(A; z) denotes the probability that this incumbent chooses an output
level in A R+ while a monopolist.










+r1,q+qmw(1,t(q)) Πz(q, t(q)) ,
because a duopoly proﬁto fp
D
1(z, z2) accrues to the incumbent in all future periods if an entrant
of type z2 {s, w} arrives and enters, while the incumbent will face the same continuation









Let b :R+→ [0, 1] denote a belief function that speciﬁes a probability, b(q), that an
entrant attaches to the incumbent being strong upon observing the monopoly output q.W ea r e
now ready to deﬁne equilibrium when no more than one entry is viable, i.e., when (2) holds. It
can be generalized without diﬃculty to the cases of more than one viable entry (Jun and Park,
2005).




z; z)=1a n ds(R+(Q
＊
z; z)=0 where Q
＊
z=arg maxqΠz(q, t(q)) R+ for z=s, w;




2(w, w)>(1,d)K(?(1,d)K, resp.) for
all qB 0,;
ANTI-LIMIT PRICING 2010] 633) b is consistent with the Bayesʼ rule whenever possible.
Signaling in the current context is about inﬂuencing the potential entrant to believe that the
incumbent is more (less) likely to be strong by producing a larger (smaller) output, with an aim
to discourage (encourage) entry. It therefore seems most natural for the incumbent to be
believed to be more likely to be strong after a larger output, and for the incumbentʼs output to
aﬀect entry decision through the belief it generates, but not directly: i.e.,
b(q)Cb(q')i fq?q',a n dt(q)=t(q')i fb(q)=b(q'). (6)
We refer to such a PBE as a monotone PBE and focus on such equilibria in this paper.
9
III. Characterization When Only One Entry Is Viable
In this section we analyze the cases that once the market reaches duopoly, no further entry
is proﬁtable owing to (2). Our focus is on the equilibria in which an incumbent sometimes
distorts its output downward, or equivalently, its price upward, from the myopicoptimum level,
in order to promote entry. For a stark contrast with conventional limit pricing behavior, we say
that anti-limit pricing arises if distortion never arises in the other direction.
10 Formally,
Deﬁnition 2: Anti-limit pricing arises in an equilibrium (s, t, b)i f
s([0, qs); s)+s([0, qw); w)>0, and s((qs,  ); s)=s((qw,  ); w)=0. (7)
All entry is detrimental to the incumbent in the short-term. Any incentive to promote
entry, therefore, comes from potential long-term beneﬁts: inducing entry by a weak ﬁrm
prevents entry by a strong ﬁrm in the future (which would take place if weak entry was
deterred), which beneﬁts the incumbent in the long-run because the duopoly proﬁt is larger
against a weak competitor than a strong one. For such long-term beneﬁts to exist, it is
necessary that a weak ﬁrm recovers the entry cost K when it enters against a weak incumbent,
i.e., the second inequality of (4) holds, for otherwise a weak ﬁrm would never enter. Note that




2 (w, w). We
establish below that as long as this is the case the anti-limit pricing is the only sensible
equilibrium outcome for an open set of environments.
At the center of the anti-limit pricing is a strong incumbent who desires to appear weak by
imitating a weak incumbentʼs output to reap the aforementioned long-term beneﬁt s .I faw e a k
entrant were to enter against an incumbent of unknown type (but not against a strong
incumbent), then a weak incumbent would not mind such imitation because it would not aﬀect
the entry prospects that a weak incumbent faces.
11 As a result, a pooling equilibrium arises in
which the two types of incumbent pool by producing the myopic optimum output level of a
weak incumbent. Then, the ﬁrst potential entrant that arrives enters regardless of its type, and
the incumbent and the entrant earn the Cournot duopoly proﬁts thereafter without further entry.
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9 All our results are true when the second condition of (6) is weakened as: t(q)Bt(q')i fb(q)=b(q')a n dq?q'.
10 If we allow distortion in the other direction, the anti-limit pricing phenomenon arises in a wider class of
environments, sometimes for a reason unrelated to promoting entry.
11 Note that a strong ﬁrm would enter whenever a weak ﬁrm would.A separating equilibrium results if a weak entrant were to enter against a weak incumbent
but not against an incumbent of unknown type: Since producing a weak incumbentʼs output
level would not prompt entry by a weak ﬁrm when the imitation by a strong incumbent is
foreseen, to dissuade such imitation and achieve separation, a weak incumbent distorts its
output below the myopic optimum and thereby induce entry by both types. A strong incumbent
sticks with its own short-run optimum output and faces entry by only a strong type. If the
incumbent is weak, therefore, a duopoly forms as soon as an entrant arrives regardless of its
type. If the incumbent is strong, monopoly is maintained as long as the arrived potential entrant
is weak; the ﬁrst strong entrant that arrives will enter, forming a duopoly that will remain
thereafter. Note that the anti-limit pricing is exercised by a strong incumbent in a pooling
equilibrium, but by a weak incumbent in a separating equilibrium.
We now formally characterize the environments in which the anti-limit pricing arises.
Suppose the following inequalities hold:
max {p
T






(i) a weak type would enter against a weak incumbent but not against a strong incumbent;
(ii) a strong type would enter regardless of the incumbentʼs type;
(iii)no second entry would take place.
In a separating equilibrium with the anti-limit pricing as described earlier, a strong
incumbent produces qs, its one period monopoly output, and faces entry only by a strong type
(i.e., t(qs)=0), whilst a weak incumbent produces q
＊?qw to induce entry by either type of
entrant (i.e., t(q
＊)=1). If the weak type produces any larger output
12, it would invite imitation
by a strong incumbent and thereby discourage weak entry. Such an equilibrium exists, as
veriﬁed below, if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
Πs(0, 1)?Πs(qs,0 ) ?Πs(qw, 1), and (9)
Πw(qw,0 ) ?Πw(q




where Πz(q, r)i sa sd e ﬁned in (5) with t(q)=r and q
＊
M :=min {q>0|Πs(q,1 ) =Πs(qs, 0)} 





M (? qw) is the smallest monopoly output level such that a strong
incumbent is indiﬀerent between producing q
＊
M and facing entry by both types, and producing
qs and facing entry by strong type only. Hence, a strong incumbent would ﬁnd it optimal to
produce qs if a weak entrant would enter when qCq
＊
M a n dw o u l dn o te n t e ro t h e r w i s e .I n
addition, given the same entry strategy, (10) implies that a weak incumbent would prefer
producing some output level not exceeding q
＊
M to producing any output larger than q
＊
M.S i n ce
Πw(q, 1) is continuous in q,w em a yl e tq
＊ to be a solution to max0CqCq＊
MΠw(q,1 ) .
13 Then, a
weak incumbent would ﬁnd it optimal to produce q
＊, again given the same entry strategy.
Since this entry strategy is optimal (as per (i) -(iii) above), we have constructed a desired
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12 To be fully precise, “any larger output” means “any larger output that generates a higher monopoly proﬁt,” as
elaborated below.
13 Note that q
＊=q
＊




M, e.g., when pw(·) is single-peaked.equilibrium, formally described as
[SE] s({qs}; s)=s({q










Next, we examine the anti-limit pricing as arises in a pooling equilibrium. As explained
earlier, this is possible when a weak incumbent does not mind being imitated by its strong
counterpart because that does not deter weak entry. Such an equilibrium exists, as veriﬁed
below, if a strong incumbent prefers the output-entry prospect pair (qw,1 )t o( qs, 0), and a
weak incumbent prefers (qw,1 )t o( qw, 0), the latter being the best it may achieve by deterring
weak entry, i.e., if
Πs(qs,0 ) ?Πs(qw,1 )a n dΠw(qw,0 ) ?Πw(qw, 1). (11)
There are two cases to consider. First, if a weak entrant would enter under the prior belief




2(w, w)), then the following
is easily veriﬁed to be an equilibrium: a strong incumbent always imitates its weaker
counterpart by producing qw, and a weak entrant enters if qCqw provided no entry took place
previously and do not otherwise, formally described as
[PE] s({qw}; s)=s({qw}; w)=1; t(q)=1 "q [0, qw], t(q)=0 "q>qw;
b(q)=ms "q [0, qw], b(q)=1 "q>qw.
In the alternative case that a weak entrant would not enter under the prior belief on the




2 (w, w)), a partial pooling equili-
brium exists in which a strong incumbent mixes between producing qw and qs, and a weak
entrant mixes between entering and not entering after qw. To see this, note that Πs(qw, r
＊)=Πs
(qs,0 )f o rs o m er
＊ (0, 1) since Πs(qw, r) is continuous with respect to r and Πs(qw,0 ) ?Πs
(qs,0 ) ?Πs(qw, 1) where the latter inequality is from (11). Hence, if a weak incumbent enters
with probability r
＊ after an incumbentʼs output of qw or lower but with probability 0 otherwise,
then it would be optimal for a strong incumbent to mix between producing qw and producing
qs,
14 say with probabilities s
＊ and 1,s
＊, respectively, and for a weak incumbent to produce

















so that a weak ﬁrm would be indiﬀerent between entering and not after qw, then the postulated
mixed entry behavior of a weak ﬁrm would be justiﬁed and the partial pooling equilibrium
conﬁrmed. We can ensure this to be the case by ﬁnding s
＊ (0, 1) that solves (12), which
exists because b
＊ (0, ms) since a weak ﬁrm would enter against a weak incumbent but not
under the prior belief in the current case. Thus, we have constructed a desired equilibrium
which is formally described as
[PPE] s({qs}; s)=1,s
＊, s({qw}; s)=s
＊; s({qw}; w)=1; t(q)=r
＊ "q [0, qw],
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14 From (5) it is obvious that Πs(qs,0 ) >Πs(q,0 )f o ra l lq>qw, q4qs. Note that ps(q)?ps(qw) for all q?qw:
Otherwise, say ps(q ˜)Bps(qw) for some q ˜?qw, then pw(q ˜)Bpw(qw) because 0Ccw(q ˜),cs(q ˜)Ccw(qw),cs(qw) due to
(1), contradicting the unique optimality of qw. Hence, Πs(q, t
＊)?Πs(qw, t
＊) holds by (5) for any q?qw.t(q)=0 "q>qw; b(q)=b
＊ "q [0, qw], b(q)=1 "q>qw.
Notice that (11) is implied by (9) and (10) because Πw(q,1 ) CΠw(qw, 1) for any q. Hence
the anti-limit pricing arises if (11) holds, as summarized in Theorem 1 below. In fact, the anti-
limit pricing necessarily arises in all monotone PBE if (11) holds, as is stated in Theorem 1
and proved in the Appendix.




2(w, w)a n dﬁx q (0, 1). Let ΨS be the set of all (K, ms,
d) R+×(0, 1)×(0, 1) for which (8), (9), and (10) are satisﬁed; Let Ψ be the set of all (K,
ms, d) for which (8) and (11) are satisﬁed. Then, Ψ ΨS4  , and the anti-limit pricing arises
in a separating monotone PBE for all (K, ms, d) ΨS and in a pooling monotone PBE for all
(K, ms, d) Ψ . Furthermore, the anti-limit pricing arises in all monotone PBE if (K, ms, d) Ψ .
Proof: See Appendix.
This theorem identiﬁes a suﬃcient condition for the anti-limit pricing. This condition is
not a necessary condition as it stands, because output reduction may occur in a broader set of
circumstances due to unnatural oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs. For example, think of a situation in
which the two types of incumbent separate themselves by producing their respective myopic
optima, i.e., Πs(qw,1 ) ?Πs(qs,0 )a n dΠw(qs,0 ) ?Πw(qw, 1), and a weak ﬁrm would enter
only against a weak incumbent. In this situation the following would also be an equilibrium: a
strong incumbent produces qs and a weak incumbent produces slightly less than qw,s a yq' w,s o
long as Πw(qs,0 ) ?Πw(q' w, 1), supported by the posterior belief b(q)=0i fqCq' w and b(q)=1
otherwise. The latter equilibrium is supported by unnatural oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs and can be
eliminated by an argument in the spirit of the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). The
next theorem states that the suﬃcient condition in Theorem 1 is also a necessary condition for
the anti-limit pricing if an appropriate version of the Intuitive Criterion is imposed (under a
mild technical condition).
Since the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps is deﬁned for a staticsetting, we modify it
for our dynamic context as formalized below. The core idea is: If one incumbent type cannot
beneﬁt by producing a non-equilibrium output level regardless of how the other party responds,
whilst an incumbent of the other type may and indeed does beneﬁt from any optimal response
of the other party as long as the other party places no posterior probability on the former type,
then the equilibrium is deemed not to be robust.




w be the equilibrium payoﬀs
of a strong and weak incumbent, respectively. This PBE satisﬁes the Intuitive Criterion if there
do not exist a non-equilibrium output level q ˜B0 and a type z ˜ {s, w} such that i) Π
＊
z >






Condition i) says that an incumbent of a type other than z ˜ cannot beneﬁt by producing q ˜
(once or repeatedly) regardless of how a weak ﬁrm may change its entry decision in the
sequel.
15 Condition ii) implies that, if the arrived entrant infers, upon observing output of q ˜
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15 In the current context, the only strategic interaction is the impact of the incumbentʼs current output on the entry
decision of a weak ﬁrm in the next period. Therefore, we maintain that a potential entrant always undertakes the strictly
dominant strategies of entering into a monopoly market if it is of a strong type, and not entering into any duopoly
market, and that multiple ﬁrms in the market play the Cournot equilibrium.unexpectedly, that the incumbent cannot be of a type other than z ˜ due to i), then a z ˜-type
incumbent would indeed improve upon the supposed equilibrium by producing q ˜ ,w h i chi nt u r n
justiﬁes the arrived entrantʼs inference and corresponding optimal response. If there exist such q ˜
and z ˜ that satisfy i)a n dii), therefore, a z ˜-type incumbent would deviate and upset the supposed
equilibrium.
Theorem 2: Suppose (2) holds and c' s (qw) 4 c'w (qw). If the anti-limit pricing arises in a
monotone PBE
16 that satisﬁes the Intuitive Criterion, then (K, ms, d) cl(Ψ) where cl(Ψ)i st h e
closure of Ψ .
Proof: See Appendix.
In the rest of this section we discuss the robustness of our main ﬁndings. Recall that we
provided the analysis for the case that each potential entrant, upon arrival, observes only the
last periodʼs output level. First, we establish that the main insights of the paper extend to
alternative cases.
We start with the case that each entrant observes the number of periods that have passed
as well as the output level of the incumbent in the last period. In this case the separating
equilibrium with anti-limit pricing described in [PE] continues to be an equilibrium with the
following interpretation: The entrant arriving in period t>1 calculates the posterior m
t-1
s for the
incumbent being a strong type at the point of choosing the output level q
t-1 of period t,1
conditional on there having been no entry until then, based on the equilibrium strategies
described in [SE]. Note that m
t-1
s >ms because, according to the equilibrium strategy proﬁle, the
posterior for the incumbent being strong gets enhanced by the fact that no entry occurred. Since




strategies remain to be optimal for all periods until an entry takes place.
The pooling equilibrium, [PE], is easily veriﬁed to be an equilibrium in this case as well
because m
t-1
s =ms since the incumbent always produces qw regardless of its type. The partial
pooling equilibrium, [PPE], is also veriﬁed to be an equilibrium with the following
modiﬁcation: In periods 0 and 1 the strategies in [PPE] are followed. The entrant arriving in
period 2 updates m
1
s by the Bayesʼ rule conditional on no entry having occurred in period 1,
where m
1
s>ms for the same reason as above. Since the arguments leading to the speciﬁcation of
[PPE] are valid as long as m
1
s>b
＊, which is the case because m
1
s>ms>b
＊, the strategies in














＊ . Since an analogous logic applies to all future periods
without a previous entry, the equilibrium [PPE] extends to this case. Consequently, the ﬁrst
claim of Theorem 1 extends to this case.
To be able to discuss the second claim of Theorem 1, we need to reinterpret the notion of
monotone PBE as the condition (6) holding for every period. Yet, the second claim may not
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16 A strong ﬁrm is not guaranteed to enter regardless of the posterior belief by condition (2) alone. For this result,
therefore, we naturally modify the deﬁnition of monotone PBE by requiring the condition (6) for the entry strategy of a
strong potential entrant as well.
17 The arguments hold even if m
t-1
s ?b
＊, but in this case a pooling equilibrium with anti-limit pricing appears more
plausible.hold as it stands in the current case, because the equilibrium to prevail in a continuation game
can depend on the previous periodʼs output in various sorts of ways, e.g., a continuation
equilibrium that is better for a weak incumbent could ensue when the previous periodʼs output
is above qw than when it is below qw. Hence, we need to strengthen the notion of monotone
PBE as: the entry strategy t
t in every period t is determined by m
t-1
s , i.e., t
t(q)=t(q|m
t-1
s )a n d
t(q|ms)Bt(q|m' s)i fms?m' s. Then, it is straightforward to see that the proof of the second claim
of Theorem 1 in the Appendix extends to the current case.
Next, consider the other case that each potential entrant observes the full history of the
output levels of the incumbent. In this case, too, the separating equilibrium, [SE], continues to
be an equilibrium with m
t-1
s calculated based on the full history of output levels (and no
previous entry).
18 In addition, variants of [SE] may also constitute equilibria in which the weak
incumbentʼs output level q
＊
t in period t vary with t, supported by appropriate belief proﬁles, as
long as a strong incumbent does not beneﬁt by imitating q
＊
t (up to a certain period or forever).
A weak incumbent may have higher equilibrium payoﬀs in some of these variants because it
has more scope for manipulating output levels: For instance, it may produce less than q
＊ in the
initial period, then produce an output level closer to (but no higher than) qw in all subsequent
periods, without prompting imitation by its strong counterpart. Hence, anti-limit pricing arises
in such variants of [SE]. The pooling equilibrium, [PE], and the partial pooling equilibrium,
[PPE], can be veriﬁed to be equilibria in this case, too, by the same reasoning as before. Lastly,
the second claim of Theorem 1 extends to the current case as well in the sense explained
above.
Another point for discussion is that a weak entrant might not enter if it foresees itself
exiting the market in the future due to an excessive number of strong ﬁrms that will enter. We
preclude this possibility from the outset by assuming zero ﬁxed cost. Although possibility of
exit tends to make weak entrants less likely to enter/survive, we stress that our results do not
hinge on the absence of exit possibility. For instance, suppose that the ﬁrms in our current
model incur a ﬁxed cost such that a weak ﬁrm would exit because it cannot recover the ﬁxed
cost if there are two or more strong ﬁrms that have entered as well. Note, however, that once a
weak entrant enters and forms a duopoly with the incumbent, no two or more strong ﬁrms will
enter subsequently because not all of them will be able to recover the entry cost (although once
entered, their operating proﬁts may be positive). Foreseeing this, not even one strong ﬁrm
would enter because it would not recover the entry cost, either, given that the weak ﬁrm would
stay. Thus, exit by a weak entrant is possible but does not materialize, and the anti-limit pricing
still prevails.
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18 In this equilibrium, the posterior is m
t-1
s =0 after a history of qi=q
＊ for i=0, …, t,2, but switches to m
t
s=1 after
a history of qi=q
＊ for i=0, …, t,2a n dqt-1>q
＊. The latter history being on oﬀ-equilibrium-path, this is ﬁne in
PBE. Thus, the strategy of producing q
＊ for one period then qw in all subsequent periods, which appears attractive
when any signaling act is perfectly observable to all future entrants, is not necessarily viable especially if a strong
incumbent ﬁnds imitating it more proﬁtable than producing qs all the time. However, producing q
＊ for suﬃciently
many periods before producing qw can be eﬀective because imitating such behavior is more costly for a strong
incumbent.IV. Example When Only One Entry Is Viable
In this section, for the sake of providing a guideline, we illustrate the areas ΨS and Ψ for
a simple case of a linear demand p(q)=1,q and constant marginal costs, namely, cs(q)=0 for
all qB0a n dcw(q)=c ¯q. Since the signaling motives (either to deter or promote entry) are larger
for higher q, we present the limit case of q=1. Conditions (2) and (4) require 0?c ¯?0.1 in
this case. In Figure 1 we plot, for various values of 0?c ¯?0.1, the areas of (ms, d) for which
anti-limit pricing arises in a separating equilibrium, i.e., the projection of ΨS onto (ms, d), in
diagram (a); and that corresponding to a pooling equilibrium, i.e., the projection of Ψ onto (ms,
d), in diagram (b). Figure 1 (c) shows these areas for c ¯=0.09, along with the (lightly shaded)
area for which conventional limit pricing arises in equilibrium. When the future is insigniﬁcant
relative to the present, the motive to inﬂuence entry decision via signaling is limited; hence,
Figure 1 presents the cases in which the current periodʼs proﬁt alone is not more important than
all future periodsʼ proﬁts combined, i.e., d>0.5.
If an incumbent were to produce its myopic monopoly output, its type could be inferred
from the output level and a strong incumbent would face entry only by a strong type. If it
behaved as if it were a weak incumbent instead, it would face entry by both types of entrant.
This mimicking behavior has three eﬀects on the incumbentʼs proﬁt stream: it reduces its
monopoly proﬁt; it shifts weight from the monopoly proﬁt to post-entry, duopoly proﬁts by
reducing the expected duration of monopoly; and it increases the expected duopoly proﬁts. The
ﬁrst two eﬀects are negative, while the third is positive. If duopoly proﬁts carry enough weight
relative to the monopoly proﬁts in the expected stream of proﬁts, then the positive eﬀect
dominates and a strong incumbent would have incentive to mimic a weak incumbentʼs behavior,
resulting in the anti-limit pricing.
Post-entry proﬁts carry more weight for an incumbent when the expected duration of the
market is longer
19 or new entry threats arise with a higher frequency, both of which are
reﬂected as high d in our model. Hence, anti-limit pricing tends to arise for higher d,a s
depicted in Figure 1.
The beneﬁt of anti-limit pricing comes from the prevention of a strong entry through
earlier inducement of a weaker one. This beneﬁt is small if either a strong entry is unlikely in
any case, or the prospect of actually inducing a weak entry is low. Hence, anti-limit pricing
does not arise if ms is either too low or too high.
In a separating equilibrium, a weak incumbent has to distort monopoly output to induce
weak entry. Such a distortion would not be worthwhile if the foregone monopoly proﬁt stream
were to be large due to the infrequency of strong entrantsʼ arrivals. This is reﬂected in Figure 1:
The anti-limit pricing areas have higher lower bounds of ms for separating equilibria than for
pooling equilibria.
As shown in Figure 1(c), conventional limit pricing also arises in dynamic settings. For
this to take place, in contrast to the anti-limit pricing, a weak incumbent must desire to appear
strong by imitating a strong incumbentʼs output, and to thereby deter weak entry. This
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19 Anti-limit pricing may arise in long enough, yet ﬁnite horizon models. Our search for a 3-period example was
unsuccessful, though. Hence, we opted to present it in an inﬁnite horizon model which may be simpler to analyze
conceptually.mimicking behavior has three eﬀects on the weak incumbentʼs proﬁts t r e a m :i tr e d u ce si t s
monopoly proﬁt; it shifts weight to the monopoly proﬁt from post-entry, duopoly proﬁts; and it
reduces the duopoly proﬁts on average. The ﬁrst and third eﬀects are negative, while the second
is positive. If the weight of duopoly proﬁts is small relative to that of monopoly proﬁts in the
expected proﬁt stream, then the positive eﬀect dominates and limit pricing arises. Relative to
the area of the anti-limit pricing, this tends to happen for lower d (because monopoly proﬁts
are front-loaded in the proﬁt stream) and for not too high ms (otherwise, deterring weak entry
would have a negligible eﬀect), as shown in the diagram. It needs be noted, though, that the
presented diagram is for the speciﬁc demand and cost functions selected for ease of calculation:
the area of the anti-limit pricing can be larger or smaller for other demand and cost
speciﬁcations.
V. Examples When More Than One Entry Is Viable
The previous sections illustrate the essential forces behind the anti-limit pricing: If entry is
bound to occur eventually and the post-entry proﬁt is important, the incumbent may prefer to
have weaker ﬁrms enter because the higher post-entry proﬁts from having a weaker competitor
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FIG.1overcompensates the loss from allowing an early entry. Clearly, these forces are not limited to
environments that allow only one entry, although the previous section focused on such
environments for analytical ease. In this section we demonstrate that the anti-limit pricing arises
in a wider class of environments in various forms. For instance, the anti-limit pricing may arise
at multiple stages as the market structure evolves due to entry, possibly occurring in turns with
conventional limit pricing.
1. Two Entry Case
We now provide an environment in which up to two entries indeed take place and the anti-
limit pricing arises both when there is a single incumbent in the market and when two ﬁrms
operate in the market after a ﬁrst entry. We are conﬁdent that the anti-limit pricing can happen
when more entries are viable as well, although it is an open question whether it is compatible
with arbitrarily many viable entries. The problem becomes more complex as more entries are
viable because the contingencies to consider increase exponentially, let alone the additional
issues that crop up when multiple ﬁrms operate in the market, such as joint signaling and
bargaining amongst them.
We continue with the case of a linear demand and constant marginal costs described in the
last section. Recall market demand p(q)=1,q and cost functions cs(q)=0a n dcw(q)=c ¯q.S e t
c ¯=0.05, ms=ms=0.8, d=0.972 and K=1.89. A separating equilibrium in this environment has
the following properties. (i) A strong incumbent produces its myopic monopoly output, 0.5,
whereas a weak incumbent produces q
＊
M=0.471,
20 below its monopoly output (0.475), to deter
imitation by the strong counterpart. (ii) Consequently, an entrant of either type enters if the
single incumbentʼs production last period was q
＊
M or lower, but only a strong type enters
otherwise. (iii) When there are two ﬁrms in the market, they produce the Cournot outputs
unless both ﬁrms are weak; if both ﬁrms are weak they produce Q
＊
D =0.466 (i.e., 0.233 each),
less than their Cournot output (0.634), to deter imitation by diﬀerent pairs of duopoly ﬁrms.
(iv) Consequently, an entrant of either type enters if the duopoly output last period was Q
＊
D
=0.466 or lower, whereas only a strong type enters otherwise. (v) If there are three or more
ﬁrms in the market they produce the Cournot outputs, and no additional entry takes place
regardless of their total output.
Verifying this equilibrium requires checking, for various market structures, the incentive
compatibility of the ﬁrms in the market (of various type-compositions) and the appropriate
entry conditions of potential entrants. This is a straightforward, albeit lengthy, exercise which is
available in an earlier version (2005) of this paper (and hence is omitted here). Two conditions
worth noting here are: q
＊
M=0.471 is the smallest distortion below a weak incumbentʼs myopic
optimum, that prevents imitation by a strong incumbent; and Q
＊
D =0.466 is the smallest
distortion below the Cournot duopoly output of two weak ﬁrms, that prevents (noncooperative)
imitation by ﬁrms in any other duopoly. (For referees only, this equilibrium is fully veriﬁed in
Appendix X at the end of this paper.)
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20 All numerical values were calculated using Mathematica (a ﬁle is available from the authors) and are reported here
as the three-digit approximations below the decimal point.2. Anti-limit Pricing with the Prospect ofLimit Pricing
Here we provide an example where (separating) anti-limit pricing arises when the industry
is monopoly, but conventional limit pricing arises when the industry becomes duopoly. We
continue with the case of a linear demand p(q)=1,q and cost functions cs(q)=0a n dcw(q)
=c ¯q. In this senario anti-limit pricing can arise with c ¯>0.1. Set q=1, c ¯=0.11, ms=ms=0.95,
d=0.93 and K=1.15. In the equilibrium: (i) An incumbent produces its myopic monopoly
output, 0.5, if strong, but q
＊
M=0.398 if weak (less than its myopicmonopoly output, 0.445). (ii)
Consequently, an entrant of either type enters if the single incumbentʼs production last period
was q
＊
M or lower, but only a strong type enters otherwise. (iii) When there are two ﬁrms in the
market, they produce the Cournot outputs unless both ﬁrms are weak; in the latter case, each
ﬁrm produces 0.315, a half of the Cournot duopoly output when one ﬁrm is strong and the
other is weak, Q
＊
D =0.63. (iv) Consequently, a strong ﬁrm would enter if the duopoly output
were less than Q
＊
D =0.63, while neither type would otherwise. (v) If there were three or more
ﬁrms in the market they would produce the corresponding Cournot outputs, and, regardless of
their total output, no additional entry would take place.
We now verify the equilibrium conditions. Let〈z1, z2〉denote a duopoly formed by an
incumbent of type z1 and an entrant of type z2. Note that〈s, w〉cannot be formed because a
weak entrant would not enter against a strong incumbent. Observing Q
＊
D, therefore, a potential
entrant infers that the market is either 〈w, s〉 or 〈w, w〉 with probability ms and 1, ms,
respectively. Given this posterior, a strong ﬁrm would not enter because the expected
discounted sum of income stream, 1.112, is less than K. We postulate the same posterior belief
for duopoly outputs exceeding Q
＊
D, so that a strong ﬁrm would not enter after such outputs,
either. On the other hand, for duopoly output less than Q
＊
D, we postulate that the market is
believed to be〈w, w〉for certain, so that a strong ﬁrm would enter. A weak ﬁrm would never
enter into a duopoly market, because even if the market is〈w, w〉the expected discounted
income stream when entered, 0.707, is less than K.T h u s ,w eh a v ev e r i ﬁed the optimality of
entry strategy after the market has reached duopoly.
We now check the strategies of duopoly ﬁrms. The continuation equilibrium payoﬀ level
of each ﬁrm in〈w, w〉is p
D
i (w, w)$(1,d)=1.170, which exceeds 0.590, the maximum payoﬀ
from deviation, i.e., from producing the short-run maximizing output given the other ﬁrmʼs
output Q
＊
D $2, after which the two ﬁrms produce the Cournot duopoly outcome until a strong
ﬁrm enters and the three ﬁrms produce the Cournot triopoly outcome. For other duopolies,
producing their respective Cournot outputs is clearly optimal given that there will be no further
entry.
Next, to check the conditions when the market is a monopoly, we specify the posterior
belief as: the incumbentʼs type is weak if the monopoly output is q
＊
M=0.398 or lower, and it is
strong if otherwise. Given the equilibrium strategies in duopoly markets, it is a lengthy yet
routine calculation (hence omitted) to verify that a strong entrantʼs discounted sum of proﬁt
stream is 1.587 when the incumbent is strong, hence it would enter regardless of the
incumbentʼs type; those of a weak entrant are 1.170 and 0.068 when the incumbent is weak and
strong, respectively, hence it would enter precisely when the monopoly output is q
＊
M or lower.
Then, a weak incumbentʼs equilibrium payoﬀ level is calculated as 1.103, which exceeds the
maximum deviation payoﬀ, 1.102, of it producing the myopic monopoly output and facing
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strategy and the most beneﬁcial deviation (i.e., produce q
＊
M and face entry by either type): q
＊
M




In this paper we have analyzed the anti-limit pricing and fully characterized the conditions
under which it necessarily arises in equilibrium for the class of environments in which once
there is an entry no further entry would be proﬁtable. We believe that the key insight
underlying the anti-limit pricing is conveyed more clearly in such environments, due to a
relatively small number of future contingencies to consider strategically.
It was also emphasized that the anti-limit pricing is a phenomenon that arises more
extensively and in a variety of forms. In particular, we showed via examples that it can arise
when more than one entry takes place, and by oligopolists as well as by an incumbent
monopolist; and that both anti-limit pricing and conventional limit pricing can occur in diﬀerent
stages along the same equilibrium path. A complete characterization of dynamic price signaling
when more than one entry is viable appears challenging, due to various dynamic paths it may
take and the complexity of strategies that are more forward-looking; and it is a task awaiting
future research.
Situations exist in which the signaling needs are recurrent and interrelated. Examples
include recurring entry threats (analyzed here) and job markets where the dimension of ability
to signal may change as one moves up the corporate pyramid (e.g., from productive to
managerial ability). The existing literature deals mainly with isolated signaling needs, and hence
is not well-equipped to analyze dynamicsignaling environments. Our exerc ise in this paper
manifests that the implications of dynamic signaling can be drastically diﬀerent from those of
isolated signaling, and consequently, underscores the need for further study on dynamic
signaling.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1: Recall that in the discussion preceding the Theorem 1 we have shown that (9)
and (10) imply (11), which implies Ψ ΨS; in addition, we have constructed a separating monotone PBE
that exhibits anti-limit pricing for (K, ms, d) ΨS and a pooling monotone PBE for (K, ms, d) Ψ.T o
complete the proof, we show below that ΨS4  and that all monotone PBE exhibit anti-limit pricing if
(K, ms, d) Ψ.
To show ΨS40, ﬁrst observe from (5) that









1,d+dqms  . (13)
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21 In this equilibrium, a second entry is potentially viable but does not arise in equilibrium due to conventional limit




1 (z, s), (13) implies that one can choose d ˆ (0, 1)
close enough to 1 so that both Πs(q,1 ) ,Πs(q,0 )a n dΠw(q,1 ) ,Πw(q, 0) are arbitrarily large; in
particular, larger than
ps(qs),ps(qw)
1,d+dq >0. Since the right hand side (RHS) of (13) approaches 0 as ms→1
for given d ˆ, one can ﬁnd the smallest m ˆ s>m' s such that Πs(qs,1 ) ,Πs(qs,0 ) =
ps(qs),ps(qw)
1,d+dq when (ms,
d)=(m ˆ s, d ˆ). Since ps(qw)Bpw(qw)>0w h i l eps(0)C0, due to continuity of Πs, the following inequalities
hold when (ms, d)=(m ˆ s,e, d ˆ) for suﬃciently small e>0:
ps(qs),ps(qw)
1,d+dq ?Πs(qs,1 ) ,Πs(qs,0 ) ?
ps(qs),ps(0)
1,d+dq . (14)
Furthermore, since Πw(q,1 ) ,Πw(q,0 ) >0a t( m ˆ s, d ˆ) because the RHS of (13) stays positive as ms
increases from m' s, the following also holds when (ms, d)=(m ˆ s,e, d ˆ) for suﬃciently small e>0:
Πs(qs,1 ) ,Πs(qs,0 ) ,(Πw(q,1 ) ,Πw(q, 0))?
ps(qs),ps(qw)
1,d+dq . (15)





1,d+dq for every q, q'B0. (16)
Combining (16) for (q, q', z)=(qs, qw, s) and the ﬁrst inequality of (14), we deduce that Πs(qs,0 ) ?
Πs(qw, 1); Combining (16) for (q, q', z)=(qs,0 ,s) and the second inequality of (14), we deduce that Πs
(0, 1)?Πs(qs, 0). These two inequalities mean that (9) is satisﬁed at (m ˆ s,e, d ˆ). Furthermore, (10) is
satisﬁed at (m ˆ s,e, d ˆ)a si sv e r i ﬁed below:
Πw(q
＊


















where the ﬁrst equality follows from (16) for (q, q', z)=(q
＊
M, qw, w); the ﬁrst inequality from (15); the

















due to (1). This proves that (9) and (10) are satisﬁed at (m ˆ s,e, d ˆ) for suﬃciently small e>0 and,
therefore, ΨS4 .
Finally, to prove that all monotone PBE exhibit the anti-limit pricing if (K, ms, d) Ψ,w eﬁrst show
that a strong incumbent does not produce q>qs in any monotone equilibrium because producing qs is
better. To do this, notice that if it produces q>qs instead of qs, then i) the current periodʼs proﬁt is lower,
and ii) the probability that a weak type enters in the next period is reduced, say by hB0. The eﬀect of ii)
is that with probability h, instead of having p
D
1(s, w) from next period onwards, the incumbent maintains




1,d , while that of the latter is bounded
ANTI-LIMIT PRICING 2010] 75above by max0CrC1Πs(qs, r). Since Πs(qs,1 ) ,Πs(qs,0 ) >0i nΨ (from (11) and Πs(qs,1 ) >Πs(qw, 1)),





(1,d+dq)(1,d+dqms)(Πs(qs,1 ) ,Πs(qs, 0))
dq(1,ms)(1,d+dq(ms+(1,ms)r)) >0
for all r [0, 1]. Since the eﬀect of i) is also negative, this proves that a strong incumbent does not
produce more than qs in any monotone equilibrium. By an analogous argument, one can prove from Πw
(qw,1 ) ,Πw(qw,0 ) >0 (see (11)) that a weak incumbent does not produce more than qw in any monotone
equilibrium if (K, ms, d) Ψ. Since it is not viable that both types of the incumbent produce their
respective myopic output levels if (K, ms, d) Ψ because Πs(qs,0 ) ?Πs(qw, 1), it follows as desired that
at least one of the types produces less than its short-run optimum level with a positive probability in all
monotone equilibria. QED.
Proof of Theorem 2: We start with a few preliminary observations. Since
 Πz(q, r)
 r =
(1,d+dq)(1,d+dqms)(Πz(q,1 ) ,Πz(q, 0))
(1,d+dq(ms+(1,ms)r))
2 (17)
as veriﬁed by routine calculation, and Πz(q,1 ) ,Πz(q, 0) assumes its minimum at q=qz as evident from
(13),
[A] Πz(q, r) either monotonically increases, stays constant, or monotonically decreases in r [0, 1];
[B] If Πz(q, r) monotonically increases in r for q=qz, so it does for all qB0.
In addition, from (5) and [B] we deduce that
[C] If Πz(q', r')CΠz(qz, r'') where q'?qz and r'Br'', then r'>r'' and Πz(q, r) monotonically
increases in r for all qB0.
To prove the theorem, we suppose that there exists a monotone PBE that satisﬁes the Intuitive
Criterion, which we denote by (s ˜, t ˜, b ˜), in which the anti-limit pricing arises. Then, in the rest of proof
we establish that (K, ms, d) cl(Ψ) must hold, or equivalently, we show that
(a) max {p
T





(b) Πw(qw,0 ) CΠw(qw, 1), and
(c) Πs(qs,0 ) CΠs(qw, 1).
First, to show (a) by contradiction, we suppose that either p
D
2(s, w)>(1,d)K or (1,d)K>p
D
2(w, w).
Then, since there will be no second entry due to (2), a weak potential entrant either deﬁnitely enters or
not enters regardless of the incumbentʼs type. If a strong potential entrantʼs decision is also independent of
the incumbentʼs type, then there will be no distortion of monopoly output from the short-run optimum
because monopoly output does not aﬀect the entry decision of either type of entrant. Note that, given the





2 (s, s), in which case it would enter against a weak incumbent but not
against a strong one. Since t ˜(q)=0 for all q by (3) and t ˜(q) weakly decreases in q as per (6) in this case,
a weak incumbent produces at least qw because producing less would reduce monopoly output and weakly
increase the probability of strong entry, both of which are detrimental. Since a strong incumbent produces





2(w, w) must hold for the anti-limit pricing to arise. Due to (2), this
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To establish (b) and (c), we consider two cases separately. First, consider the case that a strong
incumbent produces no less than qs in (s ˜, t ˜, b ˜), hence s ˜( { qs}, s)=1 and a weak incumbent should
produce some output level q'?qw as per (7). Then, by item 1) of Deﬁnition 1, Πw(q', t ˜(q'))CΠw(qw, t ˜
(qw)). This, together with [C], implies (b).
To show (c), note that if Πs(qs,0 ) >Πs(qw, r) for all r [0, 1], a strong incumbent would
never beneﬁt by producing qw instead of qs and, therefore, a weak incumbent would beneﬁtb y
producing qw instead of q' because such production would convince a weak entrant to enter. As
this would fail the Intuitive Criterion, we conclude that Πs(qs,0 ) CΠs(qw, r) for some r [0,
1]. Since this cannot hold when r=0, it follows that Πs(qw, r) increases in r in light of [A] and
Πs(qw,0 ) ?Πs(qs, 0). Hence, we have Πs(qs,0 ) CΠs(qw, 1), i.e., (c).
The other case to consider is one in which a strong incumbent produces some output level q'?
qs. Then, by item 1) of Deﬁnition 1,
Πs(q', t ˜(q'))CΠs(qs, t ˜(qs)). (18)
This implies that q'Cqw because, since s ˜((qw,  ); w)=0 as per (7), if q'>qw we would have b ˜(q)
=1a n dt ˜(q)=0 for all qBq' by (6) and consequently, (18) would fail. Since ps(q')Cps(qw) for q'?qw
(otherwise, qw would not be the myopicoptimum bec ause pw(q'),pw(qw)=ps(q'),ps(qw)+cs(q'),cw
(q'),cs(qw)+cw(qw)>0 by (1)), we have Πs(q', t ˜(q'))CΠs(qw, t ˜(q')) by (5). Furthermore, since Πs(q, r)
monotonically increases in r for all qB0 by [C] applied to (18), we have Πs(qw, t ˜(q'))CΠs(qw,1 )a n d
Πs(qs,0 ) CΠs(qs, t ˜(qs)). These three inequalities and (18) imply (c).
To show (b), note from [C] applied to (18) that t ˜(q')>t ˜(qs)B0, for which we need b ˜(q')?1, i.e., a
weak incumbent should produce q' as well. If q'?qw, we must have Πw(qw,0 ) CΠw(qw, 1), i.e., (b), for
otherwise, Πw(qw, r) would decrease in r by [A], so a weak incumbent would be better oﬀ by producing
qw since Πw(q', t ˜(q'))?Πw(qw, t ˜(q'))CΠw(qw, t ˜(qw)) would hold. Lastly, if q'=qw (in which case both
types of incumbent produce qw) then t ˜(q) cannot be a constant in any nonempty interval [qw, qw+ε), for
otherwise a strong incumbent would beneﬁt by producing slightly more than qw by (5) because i) the entry
prospect would not change while ii) the monopoly proﬁt would increase since the condition c' s(qw)4c' w(qw)
implies c' s(qw)?c' w(qw) due to (1) and consequently, p' s(qw)>p' w(qw)=0. Given that t ˜(q) is a decreasing
step function due to (6), this implies that t ˜(qw)>limq qwt ˜(q). For a weak incumbent not to beneﬁtb y
producing slightly above qw in this case, Πw(qw, r) must not increase when r falls, which implies (b) by
[A]. This completes the proof. QED.
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